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In this essay I debate critically, and somehow playfully, some 
assumptions and shortcomings of quantitative/positivist social 
research, using a dash of common sense typical of engineers. 
Civil engineers, in designing concrete structures, particularly those made 
up of concrete, have to continuously consider the error embedded in the 
limits of available systems of calculation, ending up adopting substantial 
factors of safety as counter-measures. The study of resistance of concrete 
structures is a good metaphor for social research; and yet, quantitative/
positivist researchers, in their search for “falsifiable generalizations”, often 
forget about the omnipresence of error, let alone adopt the factors of 
safety. In short, the common sense of engineers is useful to casts some 
not-so-frequently-considered doubts over the capacity of quantitative 
methods and positivist epistemologies to create generalizable social 
science findings in face of uncertainty and the complexity of human 
societies. By casting such doubts, I advocate for a more relaxed (but not 
less rigorous) approach to social research and its complexity. 
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This essay is more than the result of my own ideas and work. Not only does its final form result from a lively 
and insightful conversation allowed by Fennia’s open review process, but that very conversation continues 
within the text: having Guntram Herb, Jouni Häkli and Ossi Kotavaara generously agreed to publish their 
comments alongside my essay, I had the opportunity to explicitly engage with their insights. This allowed me 
to structure the essay as follows: the main text contains the main argument, which, for the sake of crafting a 
text I wanted to be provocative and engaging, is quite straightforward and direct – at times indeed reductionist; 
and I used footnotes quite heavily to provide nuance to the argument and engage in conversation with the 
reviewers’ comments. As such, there are more ways to read this essay, with or without the footnotes, by itself 
or jumping back and forth to the three comments. I am thus very grateful to Guntram, Jouni and Ossi; and to 
Editor-in-Chief Kirsi Pauliina Kallio for offering the opportunity of the open review process and her support 
throughout the editorial process. I am also grateful to Pedro Magalhães, who read an older version of this 
essay and with whom I have discussed issues of epistemology several times. Though they may not be aware 
of that, I was inspired by discussions with a number of fellow scholars and friends, including Andy Inch, 
Andrea Pavoni, Eleonora Tulumello, Marco Allegra and Rui Costa Lopes. This notwithstanding, this essay’s 
many shortcoming – and especially the insolence that may surface here and there – are my own responsibility.
© 2019 by the author. This open access article is licensed under 
a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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Prologue: a qualitative researcher’s Reviewer 2
As a researcher that has been mainly, indeed almost exclusively, employing qualitative methods and 
case study research, I have lost the count of the times a peer-reviewer has criticized my work on the 
basis of the refrain “thou shalt not generalize from one case!” When it happens, that is, almost every 
time I submit an article, my first reaction is I want to write the editors an angry response, something 
on the lines of: “Dear Editors, please provide peer-reviewers with the actual competences to assess 
case study research, that is, judge whether, in light of the assumptions of case study research, my 
article is capable (or not) of building that kind of theory that (a fitting reviewer must know!) case study 
can indeed produce.”1
But then, most often, once I have read the feedbacks and editorial decision, I would take a few days 
to let off steam, before sitting down and decide what to do. Eventually, if I was lucky enough to get a 
Major Revision or Revise and Resubmit (that kind of reviews is never followed by requests of Minor 
Revision), I would give up. I would expand the methodological section with more references on “how 
to theorize from case study research”, temper the tone of the discussion and add a line in the 
conclusions that sounds like: “Although the preliminary findings of this article need to be confirmed 
by further research with wider panels of data, we can set out the following conclusions…” Although 
they usually help clearing the peer-review and have the paper published (as my fellows precarious 
researchers out there know, this is not a secondary matter), these changes signal an implicit abdication 
to the (allegedly) superior role of generalization to that of theorization in knowledge production – and, 
besides, they take space (the word limit…) that could be more profitably used to provide a better 
description of the case or theoretical discussion.
One of the last times this happened, I shared my frustration on the Facebook page Reviewer 2 Must 
Be Stopped, which is frequented by scholars from the most different backgrounds, ensuing a lively 
debate among those that were sympathetic with my frustration and those who would insist I cannot 
generalize from one single case.2 There is one simple evidence coming out from this, and other, more 
rigorous, debates (e.g. Flyvbjerg 2004, 285–286): While qualitative social scientists, and especially 
those working with case studies,3 are often even too conscious of the assumptions behind, and the 
shortcomings of, their epistemological approaches, quantitative/positivist4 researchers tend to 
consider “real science” that which stems from their epistemological assumptions only – most often, 
analyses over statistically significant samples or experiments said to produce “falsifiable 
generalizations”.5 For instance, most methodological works about case study research are extremely, 
if often excessively, cautious, as if their authors were expecting at any moment a Reviewer 2 to shout 
“thou shalt not generalize from one case!”6 On the contrary, in articles grounded on a quantitative/
positivist paradigm, I have barely found explicit discussions of the epistemological assumptions and 
shortcomings of those methods: those assumptions go without saying, so to speak, and their 
shortcomings are easily forgotten, let alone debated (but see Pepinski 2016, for an exception).7
In this essay, I will debate, somehow playfully, some of those assumptions and shortcomings, using 
a dash of common sense typical of engineers – before embracing human geography and social 
sciences, I took a master’s in civil-engineering. The common sense of engineers, I will suggest, casts 
some not-so-frequently-considered doubts over the capacity of quantitative methods and positivist 
epistemologies to create generalizable social science findings. By casting such doubts, I hope to 
contribute to a more relaxed (but not less rigorous) approach to social research and its complexity.
Some insolent remarks on quantitative research
Quantitative, positivistic-oriented social research works, to put it bluntly, through the creation of 
simplified models of social phenomena. By simplification I mean the process by which the researcher 
would select a number of variables they consider sufficient and adequate to create a realistic model, 
that is, a model capable of describing a given (social) phenomenon with acceptable accuracy. More 
variables, and more nuanced relations among the variables, more reliable the model will be, but at 
the cost of more work and computation. The perfect model, the society itself, is made up of an infinite 
number of variables, hence the need for infinite time to collect data and infinite time to process 
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findings – Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (published in 1927) made precisely this point 
with regard to physics.8 The core of the “scientific” work quantitative/positivist researchers do, apart 
from the mechanic work of collecting data and running the models, is deciding what variables, hence 
what data, are to be used and how to create links among those variables. In so doing, the researchers 
obviously influence the results on the grounds of their judgment – unfortunately however, in the public 
domain this is as obvious as Edgar Allan Poe’s Purloined Letter. In Flyvbjerg’s (2006, 235) words:
The element of arbitrary subjectivism will be significant in the choice of categories and variables for 
a quantitative or structural investigation, such as a structured questionnaire to be used across a 
large sample of cases. And the probability is high that (1) this subjectivism survives without being 
thoroughly corrected during the study and (2) that it may affect the results, quite simply because 
the quantitative/structural researcher does not get as close to those under study as does the case-
study researcher and therefore is less likely to be corrected by the study objects “talking back”.
Put in other words, all social scientists employ judgment based on their epistemological and theoretical 
assumptions. While qualitative researchers employ it mainly “downstream”, that is, when critically 
interpreting their findings; quantitative/positivist scientists employ most of it “upstream”, that is, in 
the design of the models.9 It is exactly the placement of judgment upstream the production of findings 
that which creates the illusion quantitative/positivist science is “objective”. This is the very first reason 
to be skeptical of the alleged superior capacity of quantitative research to produce generalized theory, 
when compared with qualitative research. To move a step further, let me now use a dash of engineering 
common sense.
Studying civil engineering; and a ventured metaphor
To begin with, let me briefly outline the way civil engineers are trained in Italy. During the first couple 
of years (of five, my degree was an integrated bachelor/master), the aspiring engineers would study 
almost exclusively theoretical classes such as Mathematical Analysis, Geometry, Classical Physics. In 
these classes, theoretical problems are always resolved through rigorous mathematical methods. 
During these years, “error” means the same as “mistake”. During the third year, the aspiring engineers 
would study Building Science (Scienza delle Costruzioni), which starts as a theoretical class too. The 
students would learn the mathematics behind the equations that could, theoretically, solve any real 
structural problem. But, one day midway through the course, the professor would say that, 
unfortunately, there is no way to solve those equations with mathematical methods: they are too 
complex. Some simplifications are then introduced that allow the equations to be solved, but at the 
cost of introducing elements of uncertainty to the solution. For the first time, the aspiring engineers are 
faced with the existence of the error. The following year, in the course Building Techniques (Tecnica 
delle Costruzioni), the aspiring engineers would learn how to calculate a real structure, being introduced 
to further problems with mathematics and practice: on the one hand, that even the simplified equations 
they had learned in Building Science cannot be solved once they are applied to complex structures 
typical of real life; and, on the other, that it is not even possible to know with absolute precision the load 
real materials are capable of absorbing before breaking. Eventually, the engineers will be trained to use 
the software they will employ in their profession, software that uses simplified models of structures.
This organization of the degree may well be delusional for some students; but I happened to enjoy 
it, because it forces the aspiring engineers to face several crises of their previous knowledge, thus 
stimulating them to keep searching for different ways to solve problems. Moreover, this process trains 
engineers to preliminarily assess the resistance of structures at a first sight: they learn how to look at 
the preliminary design of a structure and rapidly assess whether it may be feasible, how it may be 
feasible and – what else could be more important in a capitalist world? – how much it could cost. This 
common sense helps engineers in several ways: while calculating a structure, they will start running 
tentative models, which will not be too far from the final one; or, they would usually be capable of 
warning the architects pretty early that the particular structure they have in mind will probably not be 
feasible (or would cost much more than they are trying to sell to their clients) before spending time in 
running complex models. At the same time, and crucially for my argument, engineers are trained to 
recognize where errors appear, and estimate their magnitude before calculating structures.
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Because of the use of simplified models and the resulting errors, engineers would eventually apply 
a factor of safety to their results, meaning that they will load the real structure with a fraction of the 
maximum loads the model can resist. The factor of safety depends on both the geometry of the 
structure (an estimation of the calculation error) and the material used. With regard to materials, the 
factor of safety is smaller when using steel (in common structures, less than 10%), which is a 
homogeneous and highly predictable material. The factor of safety becomes much bigger for concrete: 
In common concrete structures it can go up to 50% – meaning that the structure will be designed to 
resist 1.5 times the maximum real loads.
The factor of safety is particularly high for concrete because of its complexity. Concrete is a 
composite, made of coarse aggregate (sand, gravel, crushed stones) bonded together with fluid 
cement. The variables that determine the strength of concrete are several: at the macro level, the 
average size of aggregate grains, the quality of the cement, and the proportion of aggregate, cement 
and water used; at the micro level, the ways the various grains and the cement are organized (the 
distance between grains, the respective position of edges and surfaces).
The point I want to make here is that the study of the resistance of structures made up of concrete 
works as a good metaphor for social research.10 Let’s say each grain represents an individual human 
being, while the cement is the bond of relationships and affects among them, characterized by 
complex mutual tensions. The whole structure, the society, is made up of pillars and beams (and 
interactions thereof), that is, interacting sub-divisions of the society: families, groups, communities, 
classes, races, genders, you name it. Qualitative case study research can be seen, from this perspective, 
as the in-depth study of a small piece of concrete looking at the micro-variables. Quantitative social 
science can be seen as the study of the resistance of the entire structure, or of a part of it (a beam, a 
pillar, a node…) through macro-level variables (shape, estimated resistance of the concrete…).
The day I remembered of my engineering training
Keeping this in mind, let me recall the day my rusty engineering common sense was awaken while I 
was reading quantitative social findings. During the very same days I was discussing what is “real 
science” on Reviewer 2 Must Be Stopped, I happened to read an article on crime and security in US 
cities by Ellen, Lens and O’Regan (2012). The article has a very ambitious and important goal, that is, 
testing the commonplace that housing vouchers policies heighten crime. In the USA, housing vouchers 
have been given to households previously living in public housing “projects”, where crime rates tend 
to be high; and, the commonplace goes, the displacement and dispersion of those households will 
displace and disperse crime, which will thus increase in the neighborhoods of destination. Indeed, 
rich evidence exists of the correlation between settlement of households with vouchers and crime 
increase.11 However, the causal relation has always been given for granted, but never “scientifically” 
verified, in public and even some academic debates – a process that accurately defines a 
“commonplace”.12 Ellen and her colleagues thence decided to study those causal relations, using a 
longitudinal analysis (1996–2008) and regression models over panel data at the census tract level 
from 10 large US cities. Not only does the article cast serious doubts on the commonplace, but it finds 
some evidence of the reverse causal history: the authors conclude that voucher holders may tend to 
move to neighborhoods where crime is already increasing – there, rental prices may be lower for that 
very reason and more landlords may then accept to rent in the voucher market.
While I was reading the article, I could feel my engineering common sense raising the eyebrows. Let 
me put this very clear, I am not criticizing the validity or the rigor of the article: it is well written, 
rigorous in the use of methodology and convincing in its line of thought; and, though I have no specific 
skills to judge the regressions, the article cleared peer-review in a good journal and I thus give for 
granted the quantitative work was well done. Not the quality of the research, rather the underlying 
epistemological assumptions about the capacity of these methods to generalize social science findings 
stimulated my engineering common sense – in short, let me be Reviewer 2, for once.
So, what is the problem? As every experienced researcher knows, collecting data about human 
beings and their interactions is everything but a simple task. In order to collect perfect data and be 
capable of picking the variables that best fit a model, the researchers should have access to every 
FENNIA 197(1) (2019) 125Simone Tulumello
possible information about each individual in the population “sample”. Of course, collecting all 
possible data on every individual would entail immense amount of work, including detailed 
ethnographies. While following the “objects” of study in their daily life, and paraphrasing what Werner 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle has taught us, the better ethnographic data is collected, the more 
the action of the “objects” of study is influenced.13 Back to our concrete, perfect data means knowing 
without margin of error the size and shape of every grain and its exact position: to do this, we have no 
other chance but ultimately break it. Indeed, researchers accustomed to participant observation and 
action research are well aware of their role in changing the very processes they are observing.
This is why quantitative/positivist researchers, whose aim is studying social phenomena without 
influencing them, use above all aggregated data collected by other parties (statistical data) or data 
provided by the “objects” of study themselves (surveys) – they construct a simplification of the 
average composition of the concrete and look more widely at the structure, or maybe one specific 
pillar or beam. This mediation creates error, because statistical data is always a simplification of the 
reality and surveys, well, for instance there really is no way to know the extent to which the respondent 
is being sincere.
This is well evident in the article by Ellen and her colleagues (2012). The authors use administrative 
data and admit they have faced important challenges.14 The authors employ several smart tactics to 
deal with such challenges, using linear interpolations among available data, comparing models that 
make or make not use of problematic data, comparing the whole model with a smaller model where 
cities with problems with data have been removed. The point is, there is no exact way to measure the 
error that the aggregate effect of such problems will produce. In fact, “error” is barely quantified in 
this kind of studies – with the exception of the statistical error of regressions.
Let me stress that these problems with data are not specific to this particular article: every set of 
statistical or aggregated data suffer of some kind of error for, as the principle of uncertainty tells us, 
there is no way to collect perfect data about any given phenomenon without influencing it. I know 
Reviewer 2 is ready to shout at me I am generalizing from one single case, but the harsh reality is there 
is no quantitative/positivist study that does not suffer of some problem with data – if Reviewer 2 has 
some doubts, they may want to pick a statistically significant sample of said articles and look into 
them, one after the other. Moreover, and this is another common issue with this kind of articles, Ellen 
and her colleagues (2012) do not discuss whether, and with what accuracy, are the 10 selected cities 
representative of the urban USA.
So, what does this mean for the main finding of the research, the value of the variable chosen to 
test the causal history reverse to the commonplace? According to linear regressions, the variable is 
statistically significant in the three models used: 0.167 (p < 0.01), 0.157 (p < 0.05) and 0.160 (p < 0.05) 
(Ellen et al. 2012, Table 4). This means that, according to the data available and their causal model, a 
household with voucher will be about 16% more likely to move to a census tract where crime increased 
in the previous year. The engineer in me would ask, what is the margin of error of the model? Is it 0.05 
(meaning that the likeliness in the real world would still be positive, between 11 and 21%)? Or is it 0.20 
(meaning that the likeliness in the real world could be between 37% or slightly negative)? Looking at 
the size of problems with data, my engineering common sense suggests, I am afraid, that the latter is 
more likely than the former.
Against generalization?
Again, my goal here is not falsifying the robust findings a rigorous research has produced in light of its 
epistemological assumptions. This is to say, in light of such assumptions, taking in consideration the risk 
that voucher holders may end up moving to neighborhoods where crime is already increasing makes 
a lot of sense, both conceptually and practically. These findings help better understand the effects of 
vouchers (e.g. reconsider “freedom of choice” rhetoric) and support a more informed policy decision 
at the local level (e.g. in extremely unequal and segregated cities, vouchers not accompanied by 
further policies may cause more problems than those they solve). As for the “generalization” of a 
socio-spatial trend (“where do voucher holders go?”), however, we have no way to be sure what the 
margin of error is and, frankly, I do not think there is a way to be. Does anyone know of any method 
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to systematically measure the error of quantitative/positivist social research (the error with data, the 
error with the simplification made by the model, and the cumulated error of both)?
Remember, engineers use factors of safety precisely to account for the impossibility to determine 
the error with accuracy. And, for a complex material like concrete, it is a very big factor, most often 
too big. But it is written down in laws, because we all acknowledge that protecting houses from 
crumbling down is more important than wasting some construction material: legal protections of 
this kind show the capacity, in the political and public sphere, to understand the limits of engineering 
studies and research. Surprisingly, the political and public discourses seem to have much less 
capacity to discern the limits of generalizations made in quantitative/positivist social research, which, 
by the way, can produce more significant damages than a house crumbling down.15 The magnitude 
of damages of the economic crisis started in 2007, together with the role certain assumptions and 
certain models used to “predict” how markets work had in creating the conditions for the crisis, is a 
case in point.16
So what? Taking research cum grano salis
I could have stopped here, but this is exactly where Flyvbjerg (2001) would ask the “so what” question. 
What is the point of my critique? Or, what does an engineering common sense suggest to social 
scientists? On the one hand, it suggests qualitative scientists to be aware that the particular piece of 
concrete they are studying may not represent the whole structure – and, as we all know, this is pretty 
well accepted among reviewers, particularly Reviewer 2. On the other hand, it suggests quantitative/
positivist scientists to remember to always use very big factors of safety when interpreting their 
findings, inasmuch as human societies are at least as complex as concrete – to be honest, much more 
complex, if anything because concrete changes very slowly in time.17 Unfortunately, this latter 
suggestion is barely heard around, let alone listened to.
Now, I am not suggesting Reviewer 2 to shout loud “thou shalt not generalize from panel data 
findings!” – while, I am afraid, this is at least as valid a claim as “thou shalt not generalize from one 
case!” What I am advocating is that it is high time we accept taking the generalizations of social 
phenomena based on panels of actually-existing data cum grano salis, that is, with the same caution we 
take theory produced through qualitative research. We need to learn that there is no such thing as 
“real science” and “hard data”, as opposed to “high-quality journalism” (as several positivist scientists 
still consider ethnography and qualitative research) – quite the opposite, that the alleged objectiveness 
of some methods is a sharp way to conceal judgment within the process. On the contrary, social 
research would benefit a lot by the internalization that our work is always contingent to some 
assumptions, that is, the acceptance of the very irreducibility and different value of findings produced 
through different methodological and epistemological lenses. Is not, after all, Reviewer 2 basically the 
incapacity to accept such an irreducibility and the pretense to force one’s assumptions upon others’ 
research?18 Is not Reviewer 2 the incapacity to accept that generalization is not the hallmark of social 
research, and that the production of theory – as opposed to laws – is as relevant an endeavor?
In conclusion, and beyond the politics of peer-review, are we ready to embrace the fact that 
contradictions are inherent expressions of the complexity of the human (and non-human) world?19
And, well, let me conclude with a personal suggestion. Always discuss your research ideas and 
methods with an engineer before running complex models or making lengthy on-field research: that 
can help save a lot of time!
Epilogue: the shelter we have
(Social) science has been traditionally imagined as a gothic cathedral, a perfect construction that will 
be completed and perfected in the moment the keystone will be put in its place. Of course, scientists 
have always been aware that the process was complex, slow and painful; and that external events 
may had forced reconstructing a part or even reconsidering something in the foundations. But the 
keystone has always been, and still seems to be for many, the ultimate goal, the ultimate answer – 
“42!”, Douglas Adams would say.20
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Then, this has been put into debate, from the uncertainty principle all the way to deconstruction, 
post-structuralism, post-modernism and the like. In time, the building has been savaged and seems 
now to be more a messy structure made up of ruins, shining glasses, shacks. There is the neoclassic 
glass and steel skyscraper from which economists enjoy the real world follow different paths, while 
sipping champagne, blaming state regulation, and accusing people and politicians of not abiding by 
the rules of the system. There is the post-structuralist field of ruins of the relentless critique, where 
the “so what” question echoes perennially. The construction seems to be now made up of parts that 
do not interact or, worst, create mutual structural problems.21
But, after all, it is important to acknowledge the scientific construction for its fragility, not solidity; 
for its continuous need of maintenance, refurbishing and restructuring. For, precarious as it is, it is the 
only shelter we have.
Notes
1 Throughout the text, I distinguish purposefully between generalization and theory as two rather 
different goals of social research and knowledge production (see especially the concluding section “So 
what?”) – Jouni Häkli suggested I should pay special attention to this distinction.
2 Reviewer 2 Must Be Stopped is a quasi-ironic forum for sharing hanger and discussing bad peer-
review. The discussion is publicly available here: www.facebook.com/groups/reviewer2/
permalink/10153956215715469/.
3 Here and afterwards, I use case study as the main point of reference when discussing qualitative 
methodological approaches for two reasons: first, because it has recently assumed a central role in 
qualitatively-oriented urban and geographic research; and, second, because it is the methodology I 
have most experience with.
4 Let us not forget – as Ossi Kotavaara and Guntram Herb correctly pointed out – that not all quantitative 
research seeks, from a positivist paradigm, to build global societal “laws”, thence the use of 
“quantitative/positivist” throughout the text.
5 I am aware that the dichotomic opposition I adopt throughout the essay is a simplification of the 
landscape of social research – and, at times, runs the risk of building two “caricatures”, as pointed out 
by Jouni Häkli. For one, the dichotomy qualitative versus quantitative/positivist methodologies/
epistemologies is often fuzzy, as there is a growing “gray area” (a definition suggested by Häkli) made 
up of experimentation with different approaches, the use of mixed methods and cross-fertilization 
among long-separated methodological and epistemological “fronts”. In retrospect, Hanson (2008) 
argues that the dichotomy is more “apparent than real” throughout the history of social research. 
More recently, a group of scholars based at the Sciences Po Médialab (founded by Bruno Latour) has 
developed an argument about the capacity of digital methods and big data analysis to overcome the 
quantitative/qualitative divide, creating a more “continuous” sociology (Venturini et al. 2017). And yet, 
the reality of actually-existing social research is characterized by fierce debate and contraposition 
among different schools of thought, the consequences of which we all have, sooner or later, came to 
experience, for instance when receiving a report by Reviewer 2.
Guntram Herb also spotted an imbalance in the quantitative/positivist versus qualitative dichotomy. 
Indeed, methods and epistemologies are not straightforwardly and directly associated (see Bryman 
1984, for a discussion). And yet, with regard to the argument I develop on the relationship between 
methodologies/epistemologies and the production of social research, I see that, independently from 
their epistemological orientation, qualitatively-oriented scholars more or less agree on the limits of 
their own epistemological assumptions – and hence “qualitative research”, throughout the text, means 
“qualitative research informed by a diverse set of epistemological assumptions”. At any rate, I agree 
with Herb where he suggested I owe the reader sharing openly my own approach, because this 
informs my perspective over the issues at stake. I see my personal epistemological endeavor as the 
search for critical theory, which I understand to have a twofold meaning: on the one hand, “a ruthless 
criticism of everything existing, ruthless in two senses: the criticism must not be afraid of its own 
conclusions, nor of conflict with the powers that be” (Marx 1978 [1844], 13; emphasis in the translation 
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quoted); and, on the other hand, a theory that seeks to foster, inform and support transformative 
action (see Marcuse 2010).
6 Even Yin (1994), author of Case Study Research, now at its sixth revised edition and possibly the most 
used reference in this field, seems to believe case study is a minor research method that, being 
incapable of building “social science generalizations”, should mostly be used as a preliminary or 
exploratory tool. Another example of this approach is an otherwise adorable article on persuasion in 
case study research by Suggelkow (2007). Flyvbjerg (2004, 2006) is, to the best of my knowledge, the 
scholar that has been most straightforward in advocating for, and fully exploiting, the potentialities of 
case study research for theorization.
7 This may not be particularly the case for human geography, Ossi Kotavaara suggests. I agree, and 
wish to speculate that this may be in part due to the relatively young history of human geography 
when compared to disciplines such sociology, anthropology or political science – all disciplines with 
longer and fiercer epistemological/methodological debates, from which human geography could 
learn from. The main target of my reflection is what Kotavaara suggested terming the “quantitative 
positivist paradigm or discourse” (a definition I fully embrace). What prompted me to write this essay 
is that it seems to me that the quantitative/positivist paradigm is still pretty strong within the whole 
body of social sciences – maybe not as an ideology but indeed as a “practice” of research and research 
evaluation (see Flyvbjerg 2004, 285–286) – and in particular in disciplines like sociology, social 
psychology or political science (e.g. Desch 2019).
8 According to uncertainty, there is no way to know with absolute accuracy both the position and 
speed of a particle at a given moment, because the more careful the observation, the bigger the 
impact over the particle’s trajectory. One of the implications is that forecasting the future trajectory of 
a single particle – and by extension of any system – is, pure and simply, impossible. It is quite surprising 
to me how this principle, a basic tenet of natural sciences, is basically ignored in many strands of 
social sciences, where it should be a truism. The ultimate version of the refusal to acknowledge 
uncertainty in social sciences is epitomized in grand claims, by some advocates of big data, about the 
“end of theory”: “Scientists no longer have to make educated guesses, construct hypotheses and 
models, and test them with data-based experiments and examples. Instead, they can mine the 
complete set of data for patterns that reveal effects, producing scientific conclusions without further 
experimentation” (Prensky 2009; see Kitchin 2014, for a critical overview).
9 Jouni Häkli correctly pointed out that subjective judgement plays “upstream” in qualitatively-driven 
research as well, as it shapes “conceptual, philosophical and ontological starting points” (in his words). 
I perfectly agree, and this is why I use of the term “mainly” in this sentence. Still, I have two responses: 
one, that the concepts of positionality and reflexivity have been developed – in qualitatively-oriented 
research – exactly to acknowledge and embrace the role of one’s own judgement (and even prejudice); 
and, two, that my main point here is emphasizing the generalized lack of such an acknowledgement 
in quantitative/positivist research.
10 As Jouni Häkli and Guntram Herb commented, this is a “deliberately mechanistic” (in Häkli’s words) 
and, indeed, reductionist metaphor. Indeed, my goal is not so much using the study of concrete to 
reflect on social research latu sensu, but rather using it to focus on the differences among methodological 
and epistemological approaches.
11 A caveat is necessary from a critical criminological standpoint (e.g. Sutherland & Cressey 1978; 
Reiner 2016). One should always remind that crime statistics describe “reported crimes”, that is, those 
crimes that are known to the police and the judiciary, which definitely do not correspond to the totality 
of crime as a social phenomenon. Reported crime is heavily influenced by the likeliness that a 
particular crime is reported, by reporting methodologies and by police priorities – certain crimes, for 
instance drug crimes, are almost never reported and are thus registered only when actively enforced 
by the police, which may prioritize this or that typology of crime, this or that location for their activity. 
More than that, crime itself is a socio-political construction, as many activities that cause harm are not 
legally defined as crimes – think of the fact that “honor killing”, that is, killing a wife, is still legal in many 
countries and was legal in many more just a few decades ago. As such, using crime statistics to 
conclude that “crime is high in the projects” may be problematic in the first place. Moreover, one could 
hypothesize that (Ellen and her colleagues (2012) did not consider this possibility), having policing 
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been historically particularly aggressive with (poor, mostly Black or Latinx) people living in public 
housing, the dispersion of those households may be followed by a “dispersion of policing” and, ceteris 
paribus, contribute to the dispersion of (reported) crime. That said, I will nonetheless consider reported 
crime as crime – like the article under analysis does – for the sake of the argument and because 
incorporating those reflections would just add strength to the point I will make about the uncertainty 
surrounding findings based on crime data.
12 In particular, Ellen and her colleagues (2012) were prompted by the conclusions of a journalistic 
report on the case of Memphis published on The Atlantic (Rosin 2008).
13 For a brief presentation of the principle, see note 8 above.
14 A list of some of the simplifications and problems they point out (Ellen et al. 2012, 557–558 and 
Appendix 1) follows: crime data are collected at the census tract scale for all cities but one, where they 
are available at the “neighborhood” level (usually made up of two or three census tracts); voucher data 
are missing in some cities during some periods of time (in some cities they are not available for the 
large majority of years in the period of study); anomalies on voucher data are found and attributed to 
geocoding problems (census track ID is missing, each year, in 8 to 20% of cases; in about 2% of tract/
years values deviate sharply from precedent and following years); demographic data are available 
only for 1990, 2000 and an average for 2005–2009.
15 The most evident example of this is the simplification and spectacularization of research findings by 
mass media – epitomized by sentences like “scientists say…”, “according to [insert highly-ranked 
university]…” While researchers cannot automatically be blamed for the simplifications and distortions 
of science reporting, this trend has fed back into the way quantitative/positivist social research is 
carried out, as researchers are increasingly pushed to produce novel, confirmatory, “groundbreaking” 
findings in order to publish in top-ranking journals. One of the effects is the growing concern with 
“p-hacking”, the use of various strategies (from data mining to unduly influencing data collection 
techniques) to forcefully extract statistically significant findings from vast collections of data – see the 
overview by Head and colleagues (2015) and the (in)famous case of the retraction of several articles 
by food behavior scientist Wansink (Resnick & Belluz 2018).
16 In his work on austerity politics, Blyth (2013, 32 ff.) focuses on the role played by models – based on 
neoclassical understandings of economics and used in the financial industry to measure the risk of 
loss from investments – in justifying the decisions that brought to the 2007 financial crash. According 
to the metrics provided by such technologies, systemic crises of financial markets – those very crises 
that have recurrently happened during the last century or so – should basically never occur.
17 Guntram Herb suggested that the metaphor is not fully applicable for two reasons: first, because 
concrete has no agency or, at the very least, it has much less agency than humans have; and, second, 
because the testing of a structure is essentially about true or false (“will the concrete hold?”), while 
social research deals with less clear outcomes. Beyond reiterating that this metaphor is above all 
useful to focus on differences among paradigms (see note 10), let me add a couple reflections. First, 
let us not forget that there are both positivist and post-positivist perspectives that would conceptualize 
agency quite differently. For instance, radical structuralism would suggest that the individual human 
being under a capitalist system is not really more free to act than an individual grain within a concrete 
conglomerate; and Actor Network Theory would maybe contest that the point is measuring and 
comparing the agency of concrete and human beings – and rather advocate considering agency as the 
network of relationships among them. At any rate, second, it seems to me that applied quantitative/
positivist research prioritizes seeking “solutions” to social problems – that is, it often mimics the true/
false approach of structure testing. Here, I wish to add that the core endeavor of critical social research 
(see note 5) is precisely that of questioning the definition of social problems as opposed to seeking 
direct, (allegedly) neutral and technical, solutions to them – see Gusfield’s (1989) discussion of the 
relationship between “political issues” and “social problems”, and my transposition of his argument to 
the field of urban security (Tulumello 2017).
18 I believe virtually anyone has, at least once in their life, received (and given!) a review that suggested 
rejection on the basis of comments that basically denied the very epistemological or ontological 
assumptions of the manuscript under analysis. The common comment on the impossibility to 
generalize from one case often tells precisely of the incapacity, on the side of the reviewer, to 
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conceptualize that valid social research exists that has no interest in producing generalizations in the 
first place.
19 One such attempt is the project of the school of transdisciplinarity led by Nicolescu (see Nicolescu 
2010, for a summary), which posits that different “levels of reality” exist, and that every discipline is 
incomplete because it has to remain within one of those levels. This breaks open with classical rational 
logic and its axioms of identity and non-contradiction (ibid., 29): the idea, at the core for instance of 
classical physics, that “A is A” and “A cannot be not-A”. As quantum mechanics has shown that entities 
exist that are at the same time A and not-A, the existence of different levels of reality explains how both 
classical physics and quantum mechanics can be internally correct and rigorous despite the inherent 
contradictions among their core assumptions and their findings.
20 Spoiler alert: I am referring to Adams’ epic sci-fi series The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, which 
revolves around the research of the answer to the “Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe and 
Everything” – which eventually turns out being… “42”.
21 Another metaphor for scientific knowledge is Spencer’s (1863) “sphere” floating in a space of 
ignorance. As the sphere grows, also the surface of contact with ignorance grows, allowing for both a 
pessimist and an optimist interpretation: if the amount of knowledge is represented by the radius of 
the sphere, this grows more slowly than the surface, meaning that the process will produce a relative 
increase of ignorance; if knowledge is the volume of the sphere, then it grows faster than the surface, 
and ignorance will relatively decrease in time. While Spencer’s sphere is way a more elegant metaphor 
than my cathedral, it is quite typical of a positivist conception of knowledge as a homogeneous, 
harmonic totality, which makes scarce space for conflict, debate, contradiction and the messiness of 
the real world.
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